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Abstract: We design and implement an experimental test for differential response by mortgage loan
originators (MLOs) to requests for information about loans. Our e-mail correspondence experiment is
designed to analyze differential treatment by client race and credit score. Our results show net
discrimination by 1.8% of MLOs through non-response. We also find that MLOs offer more details about
loans and are more likely to send follow up correspondence to whites. The effect of being African
American on MLO response is equivalent to the effect of having a credit score that is 71 points lower.
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1. Introduction

There are substantial documented differences between African Americans and
whites in the price paid for credit. During the 2004–2008 housing boom, Home Mortgage
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Disclosure Act (HMDA) data released by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council1 shows a 27 basis point difference (favoring whites) in contract mortgage rates.2
Conditioning on borrower characteristics, Ghent et al. (2014) find that for 30 year
adjustable rate mortgages African Americans borrowers face interest rates 12 basis points
higher than non-Hispanic borrowers. Bayer, Ross, and Ferreira (2014) find that even after
conditioning on previously unavailable credit characteristics, African American borrowers
have a 7.7 percentage point higher likelihood of being in a high cost mortgage (relative to a
market-wide incidence of 14.8%). Bayer et al. (2014) also show that lender fixed effects
reduce the unexplained differences across race in being a high-cost borrower by 60–70%,
suggesting that a large portion of market-wide differences in outcomes may be driven by
sorting across (or differential access to) lenders, rather than differential treatment by
lenders.

We examine the incidence of differential treatment by mortgage lenders by testing
for racial discrimination using a matched-pair correspondence experiment on Mortgage
Loan Originators (MLOs). MLOs are essentially licensed mortgage salespeople who assist
customers with loan applications and have the ability to offer and negotiate the terms of a
mortgage with applicants. The role of information provider and advisor in the lending
process, and the discretion MLOs have in dealing with customers makes them an integral
part of the borrowing process from a client's perspective. Discrimination by MLOs could
result in different lending outcomes between minority and majority borrowers, and also
influence outcomes as the home buying process proceeds. For example, a borrower who is
delayed or who is pre-approved for a smaller loan amount may be treated differently by a
real estate agent in terms of search effort, neighborhood choice, or expediency of service. If
differences in initial treatment by an MLO are severe (offering different interest rates, fees,
or suggesting credit repair services), this could conceivably affect a home buyer in all
aspects of the home purchase, even if they are successful in obtaining a loan.3

Our matched-pair experiment examines the response MLOs offer to initial contact
from a potential client interested in obtaining information about a mortgage loan. We
design the experiment to test for differential treatment by client race (white or African
American) and by credit score. We randomly assign pairs of e-mail inquiries to MLOs
according to our design to test for the effects of a borrower's race, credit score, and the
interaction between these two. We reveal client race to MLOs using selected client names
within each e-mail inquiry. We use only names that have a high likelihood of being given to
only one race in a sample of birth certificate for male babies born in New York City in 1990.
We examine the propensity for MLOs to respond to our inquiries, the propensity to follow
up, and the content of the response to test for differential treatment.
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To our knowledge, this is the first experimental test of discrimination by MLOs that
uses e-mail correspondence and a nationally representative sample.4 This is in contrast to
an earlier study by Ross et al. (2008), which relies on in-person interaction between MLOs
and actors and uses only select metropolitan area samples.5Heckman (1998) and Heckman
and Siegelman (1993) critique the use of actors when testing for discrimination because
actors may bias results if they are not identical along all dimensions except race. While the
Heckman critique is valid in theory, tester heterogeneity is something that can be examined
in practice. Modern in-person tests such as HUD's 2000 Housing Discrimination Study
(HDS) collect actual characteristics of testers and allow for an examination of how these
characteristics may affect results (Ross, 2002). Ross et al. (2008) does a formal
examination of tester heterogeneity in an in-person study and demonstrates that at
conventional levels of statistical significance, tester homogeneity cannot be rejected.
While we believe there is value in using in-person studies, and they offer ways to
examine discrimination by MLOs that our study cannot, our work provides some
advantages over in-person studies.6 Most importantly, we avoid the threat of actor bias by
relying solely on electronic communication with MLOs that are identical in presentation in
all ways except the indication of race. This also allows us to dramatically increase the scope
of the experiment and the geographic area covered relative to in-person studies. Using
electronic communication provides a detailed record of correspondence that allows us to
examine the timing and content of MLO responses to our inquiries. The use of the internet
in general is becoming a standard part of the home search and borrowing process which
has yet to receive much attention in the academic literature. Bricker et al. (2010) report
that 41.7% of borrowers use the internet for information about borrowing,7 and over 90%
of home buyers in 2012 reported using the internet in some capacity during their home
search (NAR, 2012).

Our results show that MLOs discriminate on the basis of race and treat clients
differently by their reported credit score. We find that on net, 1.8% of MLOs discriminate
by not responding to inquiries from African Americans while responding to inquiries from
white clients.8 We find larger net response differences across credit score types, with 8.5%
of MLOs responding to clients in our high credit score group while not responding to
clients who do not report a credit score. We also find that credit score differences
exacerbate differences in response between races. Overall, the effect of being African
American on MLO response is roughly equivalent to the effect of having a credit score that
is 71 points lower. We also find that MLOs are more likely to send follow-up
correspondence to whites than African Americans.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes an MLO's
role in the lending process. Section 3 outlines the design of our experiment, while Section 4
details implementation and sample characteristics. Section 5 presents our primary results
while Section 6 offers several robustness checks. The final section of the paper offers
concluding comments.

2. MLOs in the lending process

MLOs are typically the initial and primary contact person for borrowers seeking a
mortgage, and have discretion over how they respond to customer inquiries. MLOs may, for
example suggest that a borrower attempt to improve their credit score before completing a
loan application, or may encourage a borrower to act quickly to take advantage of low
interest rates. They may also present different fees or interest rates to borrowers, offer
encouragement or discourage the borrower from moving forward with the loan, or offer
other financial advice related to obtaining a mortgage.9
MLOs typically have contact with the client throughout the entire lending process,
from initial inquiry through loan closing, but they are particularly important in the
application process. Clients who have marginal credit depend on MLOs to give advice on
what products to apply for, what steps to take to improve their credit and whether their
application will ultimately be successful. MLOs may communicate with an underwriter, but
do not directly make decisions about accepting or denying a loan. Ross et al. (2008) point
out that while minorities are less likely than whites (controlling for observable factors) to
obtain a loan,10 this fact alone does not indicate that differential treatment by the same
lender is occurring. Differences in lending outcomes may be explained by differences in
minority selection of lenders or access to a different set of lenders. Ross et al. also point out
that differences in outcomes could be consistent with differential treatment by MLOs, but
evidence on this aspect is limited.

3. Experiment design

To test for discrimination among MLOs we design a matched pair correspondence
experiment using e-mail to inquire about assistance with a home mortgage.11 The matched
pairs are structured to test outcome differences due to race and credit score differences
among potential borrowers. Each MLO receives two e-mails in the experiment. This design,
along with the use of names to identify race, follows the Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)
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resume experiment.12 The audit methodology has a long history in the housing
discrimination literature starting with Yinger's (1986) real estate agent experiment.

We use three credit score groups in our experiment: no credit score, low credit
score, and high credit score. The low credit score group reports a randomly assigned credit
score between 600 and 650; the high credit score group reports a randomly assigned credit
score between 700 and 750.13 As a precaution against exposing the experiment, we
randomly assign a credit score for each e-mail (rather than each pair) from a uniform
distribution within each category (low or high). Although there is a chance the credit
scores within a matched pair are exactly the same, most often the scores will be different
within a small range. We use the randomly assigned differences in credit scores to test how
MLOs respond to credit score and race differences. For the portion of experiments where a
credit score is reported, the average credit score is 675. For the high score group the
average is 725 for the low score group it is 625.

We also divide our experiment into groups by the content of correspondence. We
chose this design to guard against exposing the experiment. Each group includes one of two
types of questions to be asked of the MLO. Using different questions across MLOs may
make our inquiries less suspicious for company spam filters or for co-workers who discuss
client e-mails. E-mails to one group contain a question about interest rates and a question
about mortgage fees (all questions for this set are listed in Appendix 1 in the boxes labeled
Question #1a and Question #1b). E-mails to the other group contain a question about loan
availability and a question about what information is necessary to proceed in the process of
obtaining a loan (all questions for this set are listed in Appendix 1 in the boxes labeled
Question #2a and Question #2b). To further guard against exposing the experiment to
MLOs, we randomly assign the phrases within the structure of our e-mail inquiries. For
example, we randomly assign each e-mail one of five possible greetings (Hello, Hi, Hi There,
Hey, or Dear), and ensure that the other e-mail sent to the same MLO does not use the exact
greeting. We view the benefits from not matching the text exactly (reducing the risk of
exposing the experiment) as exceeding the cost that any of our greetings (or other text
elements) might influence outcomes in a meaningful way.14Appendix 1 details the exact
layout of our correspondence and the randomly assigned text that populates each e-mail.
Our experiment includes 30 different matched pair types, representing all of the
combinations between cells in Fig. 1.15 This allows us to examine the marginal effect of race
and credit score (on the extensive and intensive margin), as well as to examine if there is a
different marginal effect of credit score across races. We randomly assign each MLO to a
matched pair type, and randomly vary the credit score within the range for that type. The
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matched pair, or within-subjects, design means that each MLO in our experiment receives
two e-mail inquiries.

Fig. 1. Experiment design.

We reveal borrower race to MLOs through the name associated with each e-mail
inquiry. The source of first names is the New York City Department of Health and Human
Hygiene (DHHH) records for babies born in 1990. The DHHH birth records provide counts
of babies born by gender, race, and first name. We begin by calculating the probability a
baby is born either white or African American for each name in the sample. We use only
male baby names for this calculation. The DHHH data do not report a count for names with
fewer than 10 babies born in a given race-gender match. This makes our probabilities for
names that are very likely to be associated with only one race equal to one, when in fact
they could be less than one. Because of this censoring, and the primary concern of signaling
race, we also consider the raw number of occurrences each name has within a given race.
After compiling a list based on probabilities and counts, we eliminate most names that have
a Muslim or Jewish origin from our list as we want to minimize any confounding effects
these characteristics would bring to the experiment.
The source of surnames is Word et al.’s analysis of 2000 Census data. This analysis
reports counts of surnames for the general population, and by race/ethnicity of
respondents to the census. For African American surnames we use the same criteria as first
names, choosing those with the highest probability of belonging to African Americans. We
choose the surnames with the largest probability of belonging to African Americans
regardless of total count, as the data shows a large number of African Americans with these
surnames in all cases. We use slightly different criteria for white surnames, as many of the
names with the highest probabilities of belonging to whites have a strong ethnic
component (for example the highest probabilities are Yoder, Mueller, Koch, all are from a
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German origin). For white surnames, we choose three names (Miller, Nelson, Baker) from
the most common (by count) names that have greater than a 0.8 probability of being white
and less than a 0.15 probability of being African American. We choose the other two names
(Krueger and Schmitt) from the list with the highest probabilities of being white,
regardless of their ethnic attachment.
Table 1. Names identifying race.
White
Zachary Miller
Brendan Nelson
Jake Krueger
Ethan Schmitt
Maxwell Baker
Spencer Miller
Brett Nelson
Conor Schmitt
Luke Krueger
Seth Baker
African American
Jamal Washington
Jerome Jefferson
DaQuan Booker
Terrell Banks
Darnell Jackson
Tyrone Washington
Kadeem Jefferson
Reginald Jackson
Jermaine Booker
DaShawn Banks

First name
Last name
P(Race|Name) Count Rank P(Race|Name) Count Rank

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

164
55
43
38
36
31
28
21
22
21
96
38
68
66
65
56
84
51
49
39

1
5
9
10
15
17
20
33 (tie)
31
33 (tie)
1
27
10
12
13
14
2
18
22
26

0.86
0.8
0.97
0.97
0.82
0.86
0.8
0.97
0.97
0.82
0.9
0.53
0.66
0.54
0.53
0.9
0.75
0.75
0.66
0.54

969910
329788
36694
35326
343081
969910
329788
35326
36694
343081
163036
666125
35101
99294
666125
163036
51361
51361
35101
99294

NA
NA
2
6
NA
NA
NA
6
2
NA
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
5
3
4

Notes: The source of first names is the New York City Department of Health and Human Hygiene

(DHHH) records for babies born in 1990. The DHHH data do not report a count for names with fewer
than 10 babies born in a given race-gender match. This makes our probabilities for names that are very
likely to be associated with only one race equal to one, when in fact they could be less than one. The first
name count is the number of babies born with that name for each race. The first name rank is where
each name ranks in the count distribution. The source of surnames is Word et al.’s analysis of 2000
Census data. For African Americans we choose the surnames with the largest probability of belonging to
African Americans regardless of total count. The white surnames Krueger and Schmitt were chosen with
the same criteria. Because we are concerned that many of the highest probability white surnames have a
German origin, we choose three white surnames (Miller, Nelson, and Baker) using alternative criteria.
The alternative criteria is to use the most common (by count) names that have greater than a 0.8
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probability of being white and less than a 0.15 probability of being African American. White names
chosen with the alternative criteria are not ranked in the top ten for all white names, thus we report
their value for rank as NA.

Table 1 shows the list of names used to signal race in the experiment. The first three
columns of Table 1 show the probability a baby is African American or white given they are
born with that name, the count of babies born with that name in 1990, and the rank (by
count) for each name. The last three columns of Table 1 show the probability a person is
African American or white given the surname, the count of persons with that name in 2000,
and the rank (by count) for each name. White names chosen with the alternative criteria
are not ranked in the top ten for all white names, thus we report their value for rank as NA.
MLOs are exposed to the name associated with each inquiry in three ways: the actual email address,16 the signature at the bottom of each e-mail (styled as “First name Surname”),
and the name plate in the MLOs inbox (styled as “First name Surname”).

Table 2 shows the frequency each name occurs in the experiment. Each name
represents approximately 5% of the sample of e-mails sent, or about 520 e-mails. The least
frequent name in our sample is Kadeem Jefferson, with 459 e-mails or about 4.4% of the
total e-mails in our experiment. The most frequent name in our sample is Tyrone
Washington, with 577 e-mails or about 5.6% of the total e-mails in our experiment. All
differences in name frequency are due to the random assignment of names to matched-pair
types, and random assignment of matched-pair types to MLOs in our experiment.
Table 2. Frequency of names in experiment.
White
Zachary Miller
Brendan Nelson
Jake Krueger
Ethan Schmitt
Maxwell Baker
Spencer Miller
Brett Nelson
Conor Schmitt
Luke Krueger
Seth Baker
African American
Jamal Washington
Jerome Jefferson
DaQuan Booker

Frequency of occurrence Percentage of e-mails

509
535
526
528
515
489
502
508
547
523
513
571
543

4.91%
5.16%
5.08%
5.10%
4.97%
4.72%
4.84%
4.90%
5.28%
5.05%
4.95%
5.51%
5.24%
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Terrell Banks
Darnell Jackson
Tyrone Washington
Kadeem Jefferson
Reginald Jackson
Jermaine Booker
DaShawn Banks
Total

Frequency of occurrence
518
485
577
459
490
497
527
10362

Percentage of e-mails
5.00%
4.68%
5.57%
4.43%
4.73%
4.80%
5.09%

Notes: Names are randomly assigned to an audit type after the audit type is randomly determined for
each MLO. Random assignment is done without replacement for each MLO so that names are not
repeated within an audit. Difference in frequency of names in the experiment is due to random
assignment.

4. Experiment implementation and sample characteristics

We identify a set of MLOs with their e-mail addresses as subjects for the experiment
through internet search. Collection of MLO contact information occurred from February
through April of 2012. We used multiple styles of internet search including Google Maps,
Google.com, Yellow Pages (YP.com) and Better Business Bureau (bbb.org). For each MLO
we identify the following information: name (first and last), state, website, email address,
title, physical address and company affiliation. When a photograph is available, we also
identify their presumed gender and race.

To ensure a broad sample and limit the potential for the experiment to be exposed,
we limit sampling of MLOs operating in the same workplace. We categorize MLO workplace
according to their place of employment on two levels: the company and the branch. We
consider MLOs to work for the same company if they work for an employer with the same
company name (for example, Bank of America or Wells Fargo). We consider MLOs to work
for the same branch if they advertise the same physical address on their website. We limit
our sample to 8 MLOs per branch, but do not restrict the number of MLOs at the company
level. The average number of MLOs per branch in our experiment is 2.38, with an average
per company of 27.
We balance the number of MLOs by state level geography, using the proportion of
the US population in 2010. For instance, Mississippi has 0.96% of the 2010 US population
and we target 0.96% (50) of MLOs in our sample to come from that state. Our goal is not
perfect geographic representativeness, but rather a broad geographic sample of the target
population of MLOs. Table 3 shows a state-by-state count of the MLOs in our experiment.17
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The state with the largest number of subjects is California with 423 MLOs, whereas Alaska
and West Virginia have the smallest number, two each. The difference between the
proportion of MLOs in our sample and 2010 sample population ranges from under
sampling by 3.9 percentage points in California to over sampling by 1.71 percentage points
in Illinois. Most states are within 0.50 percentage points of the population proportion.
Table 3. Number of audits and response rate across states.
Number of
Overall
Responded to at least
audits
response rate
one inquiry (%)
(%)
Full sample 5181
68.50%
84.93%
Alabama
70
70.71%
88.57%
Alaska
2
75.00%
100.00%
Arizona
125
64.00%
81.60%
Arkansas
49
57.14%
89.80%
California 423
69.27%
83.69%
Colorado
99
70.20%
86.87%
Connecticut 69
57.97%
73.91%
Delaware
15
63.33%
80.00%
Florida
226
73.01%
86.28%
Georgia
224
71.43%
86.61%
Hawaii
28
60.71%
71.43%
Idaho
34
69.12%
88.24%
Illinois
304
70.89%
83.88%
Indiana
143
75.87%
92.31%
Iowa
60
69.17%
85.00%
Kansas
37
74.32%
89.19%
Kentucky
93
70.97%
83.87%
Louisiana 70
72.14%
84.29%
Maine
44
80.68%
95.45%
Maryland
158
70.25%
85.44%
Massachusetts 106
51.89%
68.87%
Michigan
231
73.81%
91.77%
Minnesota 95
72.63%
86.32%
Mississippi 57
71.05%
85.96%
Missouri
101
65.35%
87.13%
Montana
16
87.50%
100.00%
Nebraska
51
82.35%
94.12%
Nevada
57
73.68%
94.74%

Percent of audit
population

–
1.35%
0.04%
2.41%
0.95%
8.16%
1.91%
1.33%
0.29%
4.36%
4.32%
0.54%
0.66%
5.87%
2.76%
1.16%
0.71%
1.80%
1.35%
0.85%
3.05%
2.05%
4.46%
1.83%
1.10%
1.95%
0.31%
0.98%
1.10%

Percent of US
population

–
1.55%
0.23%
2.07%
0.94%
12.07%
1.63%
1.16%
0.29%
6.09%
3.14%
0.44%
0.51%
4.16%
2.10%
0.99%
0.92%
1.41%
1.47%
0.43%
1.87%
2.12%
3.20%
1.72%
0.96%
1.94%
0.32%
0.59%
0.87%
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Number of
audits

Overall
Responded to at least Percent of audit Percent of US
response rate
one inquiry (%)
population
population
(%)
68.52%
79.63%
1.04%
0.43%

New
54
Hampshire
New Jersey 111
73.87%
82.88%
2.14%
2.85%
New Mexico 48
65.63%
83.33%
0.93%
0.67%
New York 328
68.75%
83.23%
6.33%
6.28%
North Carolina 64
74.22%
90.63%
1.24%
3.09%
North Dakota 27
61.11%
74.07%
0.52%
0.22%
Ohio
261
72.22%
91.19%
5.04%
3.74%
Oklahoma 64
47.66%
87.50%
1.24%
1.22%
Oregon
100
68.50%
83.00%
1.93%
1.24%
Pennsylvania 177
77.97%
89.27%
3.42%
4.11%
Rhode Island 34
73.53%
82.35%
0.66%
0.34%
South Carolina 103
63.59%
83.50%
1.99%
1.50%
South Dakota 12
45.83%
66.67%
0.23%
0.26%
Tennessee 58
68.97%
87.93%
1.12%
2.06%
Texas
225
52.44%
80.44%
4.34%
8.14%
Utah
85
46.47%
62.35%
1.64%
0.90%
Vermont
15
83.33%
100.00%
0.29%
0.20%
Virginia
144
58.33%
75.69%
2.78%
2.59%
Washington 159
68.87%
86.16%
3.07%
2.18%
West Virginia 2
75.00%
100.00%
0.04%
0.60%
Wisconsin 110
76.82%
90.91%
2.12%
1.84%
Wyoming 13
50.00%
76.92%
0.25%
0.18%
Notes: Sampling is intended to follow US state population proportions. The exact representativeness of
state populations in our data depends on availability of MLO contact information. Collection of MLO
contact information occurred from February through April of 2012. We used multiple styles of internet
search including Google Maps, Google.com, Yellow Pages (YP.com) and Better Business Bureau
(bbb.org) to locate MLO contact information.

We have 5,181 MLOs as subjects in our experiment. A notable feature of MLOs is
their relative demographic homogeneity. We are able to identify the race of MLO using
photographs for about 75% of our sample. 93% of the race-identified MLOs are white.
Gender is more evenly split, where 53% of gender-identified MLOs are male. We know of
no existing demographic statistics to corroborate our sample as representative of the
industry. Nonetheless, we did not specifically seek MLOs based on race or gender, and
believe these statistics to be representative of the industry participants who list
information on the internet. Table 4 shows complete demographic characteristics for the
sample of MLOs in the experiment.
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Our experiment began on Monday, April 30, 2012 at 2:00 pm with a set of 200 pilot
emails to a sub-sample of MLOs. The full experiment commenced 1 week later, on Tuesday,
May 8 at 1:00 pm. An MLO was randomly selected to participate in one of five rounds (one
pilot and four regular).18 A round consists of a first and second e-mail going out to the same
group of MLOs separated by 1 week. For instance, Round 3 recipients received their first
email on Thursday, May 10; they received their second email on Thursday, May 17. All
emails following the pilot were sent beginning at 1 pm Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) and
ending by 2 pm EDT. Regular rounds were conducted on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and
Thursdays between May 8 and May 29. The schedule is designed to minimize possible
confounding effects. Mondays and Fridays are avoided in the experiment to minimize the
impact of weekend lag times or end-of-week effects. The start time of each half round is
held constant to minimize unobserved time-of-day effects.
Keeping days of the week and time of e-mail sending similar within rounds is
designed to reduce noise in the experiment. Bias is eliminated through randomization of
treatment assignment and treatment order. Whichever audit type an MLO is assigned to,
the order in which the MLO receives the treatment is randomized. Should our efforts to
eliminate confounding effects be inadequate, randomizing the order of treatment causes
such effects to attenuate the outcome to zero rather than bias it. This is a key strength of
our experimental design.

Given the volume of mail to be delivered (two emails to each MLO from one of
twenty different client email accounts), we used an automated email-sending program to
minimize human error and speed processing. The program was set to initiate individual
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) sessions for each email sent with the Gmail servers,
and to wait 1–2 s between sending emails. The resulting emails are indistinguishable from
messages that would be sent directly from the Gmail web interface.
Of the 10,362 e-mail inquiries sent in our experiment, about 1.3% received an
automated response or out-of-office reply. We do not count these as a response unless a
follow up e-mail was sent by the MLO.

5. Results

The experiment provides a wealth of information on MLOs response to standard
inquiries for assistance with obtaining a home mortgage. We maintain all content for each
MLO response to use in the analysis, in addition to the date/time stamp indicating when
the e-mail was sent to examine speed of response.
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5.1. Response versus non-response by race

The most basic indication of equal treatment across race and credit score types is
whether or not an MLO responds to our inquiry for assistance with a mortgage loan. We
consider a response to be one that we deem genuinely written by a human; out-of-office or
other automatic replies are not considered a response. Our measure of response is if the
MLO ever sent a genuine e-mail response within 2 weeks of our inquiry. This measure
means that we count a genuinely human response to have occurred even if it is not the first
correspondence we received from the MLO.19 In several instances, we received out of office
replies, and subsequent genuinely human responses. In other cases we received
automatically generated commercial replies followed by genuinely human responses.
Table 4. Mortgage loan originator characteristics.
Gender
Female
Male
Not identified
Race
White
Non-White
Arabic
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Indian
Native American
Not identified

Number of audits Frequency Overall response rate

1916
2202
1063
3619
273
1
57
90
115
7
3
1289

36.98%
42.50%
20.52%
69.85%
5.27%
0.02%
1.10%
1.74%
2.22%
0.14%
0.06%
24.88%

87.37%
84.92%
80.53%

86.57%
85.71%
100.00%
80.70%
91.11%
84.35%
71.43%
100.00%
80.14%

Notes: We identified race and gender of MLOs by visually inspecting photographs when available on
lender webpages. Our approach was conservative in identifying both gender and race: if we felt there
was any room for argument about either, we categorized the demographic information as not identified.
The not identified category includes all instances where there was ambiguity in assigning race and/or
gender and when a photograph was not available. For the summary statistics shown, the Non-White race
category includes Arabic, Asian, Black, Hispanic, Indian, and Native American, the breakdown of each is
shown within the non-white category.
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Table 5. Response rate and mortgage loan originator (MLO) level response.

All audits

Overall response rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
White
African
(1)-(2)
American

68.31% 65.68%
[3540] [3402]
Depository 73.35% 70.51%
Lender
[1663] [1614]
Mortgage 64.69% 61.23%
Bank
[1411] [1305]
White MLOs 70.67% 67.41%
[2554] [2443]
Non-White 68.50% 65.57%
MLOs
[187] [179]
Missing Race 61.70% 60.80%
MLOs
[799] [780]
Male MLOs 69.16% 66.00%
[1496] [1479]
Female MLOs 70.80% 67.23%
[1382] [1264]
Missing
62.04% 62.23%
Gender MLOs
[662] [659]

2.63%
p = 0.0022***
2.84%

Response at MLO level
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Respond to Respond White
African
neither
to both
only
American
only
16.28%
49.77%
17.88% 16.07%
[632]
[1932]
[694]
[624]
11.51%
55.49%
17.69% 15.31%

1.81%
p = 0.0573*
2.37%

3.46%

20.12%

2.34%

p = 0.0163** [194]
p = 0.0094*** [327]

3.26%
14.49%
***
p = 0.0014 [392]
2.93%
13.04%

p = 0.2337
0.90%

p = 0.3189

3.16%
p = 0.0124**
3.57%
p = 0.0085***
–0.19%

p = 0.5351

[27]
21.98%
[213]
16.66%
[277]
12.98%
[184]
21.35%
[171]

[935]
46.28%
[752]
51.96%
[1406]
49.28%
[102]
43.76%

[424]
50.75%
[844]
51.48%
[730]
44.69%
[358]

[298]
[258]
17.97% 15.63%
[292]
17.85%
[483]
20.77%

[254]
15.71%
[425]
16.91%

[43]
[35]
17.34% 16.92%
[168]
17.74%
[295]
18.83%
[267]
16.48%
[132]

[164]
14.85%
[247]
16.71%
[237]
17.48%
[140]

(8)
(6)-(7)

p = 0.0980*
p = 0.1039

2.14%
p = 0.0585*
3.86%

p = 0.4282
0.42%

p = 0.8693

2.89%
p = 0.0434**
2.12%
p = 0.1964
–1.00%

p = 0.6713

Notes: The p-value represented in column (3) is from a one-sided t-test (alternative hypothesis of a
positive difference) with a null hypothesis that the difference in average response rate is zero. The p-

value reported in column (8) is from McNemar paired difference in proportions test. This test is
designed for testing the difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects, the test statistic is
χ^2 = (N_(Only W)-N_(Only AA) )^2/ (N_(Only W)+N_(Only AA)), where N represents the number of
MLOs only responding to one group. The test statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all
p-values accordingly. Number of MLOs shown in [], *=0.10 significance, **= 0.05 significance, ***= 0.01
significance.

Table 5 shows the difference in genuine response by MLOs to our inquiries across
race groups. The first and second columns of Table 5 show the overall response rate, while
columns 4–7 offer a breakdown at the MLO level for the sub-sample of the experiment that
includes MLOs who received separate e-mails from both an African American and a white
borrower.20 The response rate to white borrowers for the full sample is 68.31%. For
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African American borrowers, the response rate is 2.63 percentage points lower, or 65.68%.
As shown in the third column of Table 5, this difference is statistically significant at the 1%
level, indicating that MLOs are less likely to respond to inquiries from African American
borrowers than they are from whites.

We find a slightly higher response rate difference (3.46 percentage points in favor of
white borrowers) for the subsample of lending institutions classified as mortgage banks.21
This result is precisely estimated at conventional levels using response rate differences
that include across lender comparisons, but statistical precision is strained when using the
within-MLO sample. For institutions defined as depository lenders, which are more like
traditional banks, we find about the same level of discrimination as the full sample (2.84
percentage points in favor of white borrowers). The result for depository lenders is
statistically significant for the response rate tests at the 5% level, and at the 10% level for
the within-MLO tests.

We find a slightly higher response rate difference (3.26 percentage points in favor of
white borrowers) for the subsample of MLOs whose race is white. The magnitude of our
results is similar for the sub-sample of non-white MLOs, but the small sample size of this
group strains statistical precision. We find a smaller difference in response rate for the
sample of MLOs where we are not able to identify race (a 0.9 percentage point difference,
favoring whites), although this result is also imprecise. The level of discrimination
measured by response rate differences between male and female MLOs is similar: 3.16
percentage points for male MLOs, 3.57 percentage points for females, both favoring white
borrowers and both precisely estimated. Among the sample of MLOs where we do not
identify gender, we find only a small, imprecisely estimated difference in response rate
(0.19 percentage points, favoring African Americans).
Although we do find a statistically significant difference in response rates between
African American and white borrowers, the MLO level results shown in columns 4–7 of
Table 5 show that 66.05% of the MLOs in our sample treat e-mail inquiries the same—
either by responding to both (49.77) or responding to neither (16.28) inquiry. We measure
discrimination at the MLO level by the net amount of discrimination, or the difference in
the proportion of MLOs who respond only to whites, and those that only respond to African
Americans. Using this measure, we find a smaller level of discrimination: MLOs responding
only to whites outnumber MLOs responding only to African Americans by 1.81 percentage
points, a difference which is close to statistically precise at conventional levels (a p-value of
0.0573) despite the smaller sample size and more rigorous significance test.22
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The MLO-level results across race and gender of MLOs are similar to the response
rate results, with smaller magnitudes and some loss of statistical precision. We still find
that white MLOs discriminate, but only by 2.14 percentage points on net, with statistical
significance at the 10% level. Our results for male MLOs also remain largely the same,
showing a slightly higher level of discrimination than the full sample (2.89 percentage
points on net), and maintaining statistical precision; however, we lose statistical precision
on the results for female MLOs.
Table 6. Response rate and mortgage loan originator (MLO) level response.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Response rate differences
High credit Low credit No credit
(1)–(2)
Response rate
69.46%
65.76%
65.77%
3.70%
(includes all audits)
[2397]
[2276]
[2269]
p = 0.0005***
Panel B: MLO level differences
Respond to Respond to Respond to
Respond to
neither
both
Higher only
Low/No only
High versus low 15.21%
49.88%
19.47%
15.44%
credit
[132]
[433]
[169]
[134]
High versus no credit 15.17%
53.00%
20.14%
11.66%
[129]
[450]
[171]
[99]
Low versus no credit 17.80%
50.17%
17.22%
14.81%
[155]
[437]
[150]
[129]

(5)

(1)–(3)
3.69%

(6)

(2)–(3)
–0.01%

p = 0.0005*** p = 0.5024
(3)-(4)
4.03%

p = 0.0506*

8.48%
p = 0.0000***
2.41%
p = 0.2311

Notes: The p-value represented in columns (4), (5), and (6) is from a one-sided t-test (alternative

hypothesis of a positive difference) with a null hypothesis that the difference in average response rate is
zero. The p-value reported in column (5) of Panel B is from McNemar paired difference in proportions
test. This test is designed for testing the difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects. The
test statistic is χ^2 = (N_(Only W)-N_(Only AA) )^2/ (N_(Only W)+N_(Only AA)), where N represents
the number of MLOs only responding to one group. The test statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and
we calculate all p-values accordingly. Number of MLOs shown in [], *,0.10 significance; **, 0.05
significance; ***, 0.01 significance.

5.2. Response versus non-response by credit score

Table 6 shows the difference in genuine response by MLOs to our inquiries across
credit score groups. Panel A shows the overall response rate difference across the high,
low, and no credit score groups. Panel B shows the difference in response at the MLO level
for the sub-sample of MLOs who received separate e-mails from borrowers with different
credit scores (or one including a credit score and the other excluding). The high credit
score group received the highest response rate, 69.46%. The response rate for the low
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credit score group is 3.7 percentage points lower, or 65.76%. The difference in response
rate between the high and low credit score group is statistically significant at the 1% level,
indicating that MLOs are more likely to respond to inquiries from borrowers with a higher
credit score.

We find a similar gap in response rates between the high and no credit score groups
of 3.69 percentage points, with the response rate of the no credit score group at 65.77%.
The difference in response rate between the high and no credit score group is also
statistically significant at the 1% level. We find only a small, statistically imprecise gap
between the response rate for the low and no credit score groups that slightly favors the no
credit score group.

The MLO level results show that the majority of MLOs respond (between 49.88 and
53%) or do not respond (between 15.17 and 17.8%) to both credit score groups. As with
the race results, we measure equal treatment by examining the net proportion of MLOs that
respond differently across credit score groups. The MLO level analysis reveals about the
same level of differential treatment between the high and low credit score groups: 4.03
percentage points on net, which is statistically significant at the 10% level (p value of
0.0506). The biggest difference is the differential treatment between the high and no credit
score group, where the high credit score group is favored by 8.48% of MLOs on net. This
result is statistically meaningful at the 1% level.
Comparing the race and credit score differences shows that MLOs are relatively
more sensitive to differences in credit scores when deciding whether or not to respond to a
borrower inquiry for assistance with a mortgage loan. The relative difference between race
and credit score groups depends on which response measure is used. At the MLO level,
going from a low to high credit score roughly doubles the difference in net unequal
treatment in response/non-response compared to the difference between African
American and white borrowers. The mean difference between credit score groups (100
points), assuming a linear relationship between credit score and response, suggests that
the effect of having an African American name on MLO response is roughly equivalent to
having a credit score that is 71 points lower.

5.3. Response versus non-response by race and credit score

The design of our experiment allows us to look at differential treatment across
several possible race-credit score combinations. Table 7 shows results for audits where
whites and African Americans are assigned to the same credit score category, where whites
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are in a higher credit score category, and where African Americans are in a higher credit
score category. The magnitude of the response rate differences and MLO level differences
will be exactly the same for these results, as they use the same set of audits; however, the
statistical tests at the MLO level count only differential response by individual MLOs, so
statistical significance may vary.
Table 7. Response rate and mortgage loan originator (MLO) level response.
Overall response rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
Group Group
(1)-(2)
1
2

Equal credit
within audit
Credit categories 67.34%
combined
[1746]
Both high credit 69.79%
[1199]
Both low credit 68.12%
[1186]
Both no credit 67.03%
[1155]
White higher
71.26%
credit within au
dit
[300]
African American 65.26%
Higher credit
within audit
[248]

65.72% 1.62%
[1704]
69.13%
[1198]
63.37%
[1090]
64.50%
[1114]
61.05%

p = 0.1083

0.66%
p = 0.3366
4.75%
p = 0.0016**
2.53%
p = 0.0588*
10.21%

Response at MLO level
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Respond to Respond White
African
neither
to both
only
American
only

16.31%
[423]
14.76%
[128]
18.12%
[156]
16.07%
[139]
15.91%

[257] p = 0.0009*** [67]
72.37% –7.11%
15.00%

49.36%

[1280]
50.17%
[435]
48.43%
[417]
49.48%
[428]
48.22%
[203]
52.63%

17.97% 16.35%
[466]
18.34%
[159]
17.77%
[153]
17.80%
[154]
23.04%

[424]
16.72%
[145]
15.68%
[135]
16.65%
[144]
12.83%

[97]
[54]
12.63% 19.74%

(8)
(6)-(7)

1.62%

p = 0.1693
1.62%
p = 0.4560
2.09%
p = 0.3165
1.15%
p = 0.6022
10.21%

p = 0.0006***
–7.11%

p = 0.0173** [57]
[200]
[48]
[75]
p = 0.0187**
Notes: Equal credit within audit implies credit category is the same (high, low, no) for a given audit.
Higher credit score comparisons exclude low versus no credit audits. Including no versus low credit
score audits makes differences between race even larger than the differences shown here. The p-value
represented in column (3) is from a one-sided t-test (alternative hypothesis of a positive (or negative
for African American Higher Credit) difference) with a null hypothesis that the difference in average
response rate is zero. The p-value reported in column (8) is from McNemar paired difference in
proportions test. This test is designed for testing the difference in proportion of respondents for paired
subjects. The test statistic is χ^2 = (N_(Only W)-N_(Only AA) )^2/ (N_(Only W)+N_(Only AA)), where N
represents the number of MLOs only responding to one group. The test statistic has a chi-squared
distribution, and we calculate all p-values accordingly. Number of MLOs shown in [], *,0.10 significance;
**, 0.05 significance; ***, 0.01 significance.
[275]

Table 8. Intensity of mortgage loan originator (MLO) response.
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(1)
(2)
White African American
Panel A: Time elapsed until respo nse
Time until response (h:mm)
8:20
9:23
(29:50) (34:04)
Panel B: Length ofr esponse
Character count, all audits
426.00 431.84
(356.35) (388.34)
Character count, dropping audits with equal (within 448.74 431.84
10 characters) length replies
(347.55) (361.01)
Panel C: Follow-upr esponse
Follow-up e-mail received
6.91% 5.17%
[358]
[268]
Number of follow-up e-mails received
2.19
2.25
(0.51) (0.71)

(3)
(1)-(2)

1:03
p = 0.0879*
2.52
p = 0.3890
16.90
p = 0.0986*

1.74%
p = 0.0001***
–0.06
p = 0.9014

Notes: Row 1 shows the average time elapsed between when an inquiry is sent and when a MLO reply is
received, reported in h:mm format, these averages do not include e-mails where no reply was made.
Rows 2 and 3 examine the character count for MLO responses. Row 2 examines all audits and includes
counting non-response as zero characters, Row 3 excludes replies that were of equal length and does not
count non-responses. Row 4 and 5 examine additional genuine e-mail responses after the first genuine
e-mail response. Row 4 shows the percentage of MLOs who sent a follow-up e-mail, Row 5 shows the
average number of follow-up e-mails received. In all cases, p-values are from standard difference in
means z tests. Standard deviations are reported in (), number of MLOs shown in [],*=0.10 significance;
**, 0.05 significance; ***, 0.01 significance.

The magnitude of discrimination using only audits in equal credit score categories is
slightly smaller than the level for the entire sample; we find net discrimination by 1.62% of
MLOs, as opposed to 1.9 for the full sample. The statistical significance of this relationship
is strained, as the MLO level result has a p-value of 0.1693, outside of traditional
significance levels, while the response rate test is close to statistical precision at the 10%
level. Given that the magnitude of these results is similar to the full sample, the loss of
statistical precision does not seem alarming, especially considering that these results rely
on a smaller sample.23
The results across race where clients report different credit scores show that the
higher credit score group is favored regardless of whether they are white or African
American, but that the degree to which they are favored is larger for whites with higher
credit scores. The middle row of Table 7 shows that whites are favored by 10.21%
(statistically significant at the 1% level) of MLOs in audits where the white client reports a
higher credit score and the African American reports either a low or no credit score. The
bottom row of Table 7 shows that while African Americans with higher credit scores are
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favored over whites with low or no credit score, the difference is only 7.11% of MLOs on
net (statistically significant at the 5% level). The MLO level results show that more MLOs
choose to reply to both clients when the African American has a higher credit score, as
opposed to replying to only the white client when African Americans have a lower credit
score. These results suggest that while there is a level of discrimination that exists
regardless of credit score, discrimination increases with credit score differences between
races. A non-constant level of discrimination may mean that the source of discrimination is
not taste-based, but instead a form of statistical discrimination based on perceived group
differences.

5.4. Content of response

E-mail communication with MLOs allows us to examine not only the propensity to
respond, but also the nature of responses in our experiment. Table 8 shows how MLOs
responded in terms of the timing, length, and propensity to send a follow-up response in
the experiment.
Table 9. Side-by-side comparison of mortgage loan originator (MLO) response content.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Neutral Prefer White Prefer African American
Panel A: Author blind revie w
MLOs responding to both races
57.25% 22.67%
20.03%
(1932 matched pairs)
[1106] [438]
[387]
Reason for Preference
More favorable terms
5.94%
4.13%
Friendliness
33.56%
32.82%
Included more details
46.58%
40.83%
Explained the process
5.48%
7.24%
Un-preferred e-mail was negative
5.25%
8.01%
Facilitated the transaction
27.85%
30.75%
Un-preferred e-mail steered or was pushy
1.37%
0.78%
Other
9.82%
10.85%
Panel B: Outside reviewer blind re view
MLOs responding to both races
43.94% 29.19%
26.40%
(1932 Matched pairs)
[849] [564]
[510]
Reason forp reference
More favorable terms
5.67%
5.10%
Friendliness
47.16%
45.29%
Included more details
54.26%
51.57%
Explained the process
20.04%
18.82%

(4)
(2)–(3)

2.64%
p = 0.0817*

p = 0.1200
p = 0.4103
p = 0.0484**
p = 0.8498
p = 0.9451
p = 0.8193
p = 0.2059
p = 0.6873
2.79%
p = 0.1058

p = 0.3384
p = 0.2698
p = 0.1892
p = 0.3082
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(1)
(2)
Neutral Prefer White
Un-preferred e-mail was negative
7.98%
Facilitated the transaction
26.24%
Un-preferred e-mail steered or was pushy
2.13%
Other
3.90%

(3)
Prefer African American
7.45%
26.47%
1.37%
5.29%

(4)
(2)–(3)
p = 0.6268
p = 0.5340
p = 0.1743
p = 0.8628

Notes: Side-by-Side comparison uses the visual basic interface shown in Appendix 2 for all MLOs

responding to both e-mails in matched pairs with clients of different race. Column (2) totals includes all
instances where whites were preferred or strongly preferred, Column (3) includes all instances where
African Americans were preferred or strongly preferred. All indications of preference in panel A are
judged by the authors in a blind review where information about clients and MLOs is masked. All
indications of preference in panel B are indicated by outside reviewers in a blind review where
information about clients and MLOs is masked. The p-value represented in column (4) is from a onesided t-test (alternative hypothesis of a positive difference) with a null hypothesis that the difference in
average response rate is zero. Percentages for reasons indicated for preference do not sum to one
because graders were allowed to indicate multiple reasons for preference. See Appendix 3 for
instructions given to graders and definitions of reasons for preference. Number of MLOs shown in [],
*,0.10 significance; **, 0.05 significance; ***, 0.01 significance.

Individual results show that MLOs are substantially slower to respond to African
American clients than they are to whites. Among MLOs that responded to both inquiries,
whites received a response in 8 h and 20 mins on average. MLOs took an average of an hour
and 3 mins longer to respond to African Americans, a result that is statistically precise at
the 10% level. In terms of the length of response, a measure of response intensity, we find
no difference in the number of characters in a response when examining all e-mails.
Examining a sub-set of responses that differ by at least 10 characters (to eliminate short
generic, or form responses), we do find that whites are favored and receive a response that
is about 4% longer.

The propensity to attempt a follow up with white potential clients was much greater
than for African American clients. We find that 6.9% of MLOs sent at least one follow-up
reply to whites, while only 5.2% sent a follow-up reply to African Americans. Statistically,
this is one of our strongest results, as it is statistically meaningful at the 1% level. We find,
however, that the average number of follow-up replies sent to the two groups is not
different.

5.5. Content of response: side by side comparisons

We designed a side-by-side analysis tool that allows us to make a direct comparison
of the response from a single MLO to clients with a different race. Appendix 2 shows a
screen shot of the side-by-side analysis tool used to grade the difference between two eJournal of Urban Economics, Vol. 92 (March 2016): pg. 48-65. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been granted for this version to
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mails sent by the same MLO to different clients. To ensure an unbiased grading, all
identifying information from both MLOs and clients was masked when using the side-byside analysis tool.

We conducted both an internal (author examined) and external (a team that did not
include any authors)24 reviews of e-mail pairs using this tool. We designed the analysis tool
to randomly assign a left-side and right-side e-mail, to guard against any ordering effects in
grading responses. Graders were instructed to indicate if they thought the responses were
“Neutral”, meaning they were similar in content, language, and nature; they felt one was
“Preferred” in some way over the other, or they thought that one was “Strongly Preferred”
over the other. Graders were instructed to strictly record their opinion about the response,
and that they did not have to justify their feelings. In addition to an opinion about how
favorable the responses were relative to one another, we also offered a series of check
boxes for the reason. Graders were instructed that they were not required to use a reason,
and there was also a place to write in other reasons. Reasons for favoring included: offering
more favorable terms, friendliness, and facilitation of the transaction. Appendix 3 provides
the instructions given to graders and the full list of reasons for preference.
We graded all responses from MLOs replying to both inquires for mortgage
assistance. For white/African American matched pairs, this was 1932 pairs of responses or
3864 e-mails. Panel A of Table 9 shows the results of the side-by-side analysis for author
graded responses. We find that even among MLOs that respond to both inquiries for
mortgage assistance, some discrimination exists. Blind grading shows that about 57% of emails were perceived as being neutral between the different inquiries. Blind grading also
shows that among e-mails where some preference was indicated, we were more likely to
perceive e-mails sent to whites (22.6%) as being favorable to those sent to African
Americans (20%). The magnitude of this difference suggests that another 2.6% of MLOs
discriminate by responding more favorably to whites—this is in addition to the 1.8% of
MLOs that discriminate through non-response. The side-by-side comparison results are
statistically precise at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.0817.
Table 10. Adjusted p-values for primary results.

(1)
Outcome
Result
Panel A: Table 5
Response difference: all audits
2.63%
Panel B: Table 8
Time until response (h:mm)
1:03
Character count, all audits
2.52

(2)
(3)
Unadjusted p-value Adjusted p-value

0.0022
0.0879
0.3890

0.0308
0.9804
1
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(1)
(2)
Outcome
Result Unadjusted p-value
Character count, dropping audits with equal (within 16.9
0.0986
10 characters) length replies
Follow-up e-mail received
1.74% 0.0001
Number of follow-up e-mails received
–0.06 0.9014
Panel C: Table 9
MLOs responding to both races
57.25% 0.0817
Reason forp reference(Author blind revie w)
More favorable terms
0.1200
Friendliness
0.4103
Included more details
0.0484
Explained the process
0.8498
Un-preferred e-mail was negative
0.9451
Facilitated the transaction
0.8193
Un-preferred e-mail steered or was pushy
0.2059
Other
0.6873

(3)
Adjusted p-value
0.986
0.0015
1
0.9804
1.0000
1.0000
0.6292
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Significance levels of primary results are adjusted according to Holm (1979)'s
procedure to adjust for family-wise error, as implemented in Newson (2010). Columns (1)
and (2) repeat the results for outcomes and p-values in earlier tables for reference. The
adjusted p-value in column (3) describes a conservative (upper bound) probability that
rejecting the null hypothesis will result in one or more Type I errors across the group of 15
results.
The most common reason an e-mail was graded as preferred for white clients was
that they were given more details (46.6% of white preferred e-mails); this reason was also
the most common when preference was given to African Americans, but occurred only
40.8% of the time. The second most common reason an e-mail was graded as preferred for
white clients was that the tone of the e-mail was more friendly (33.56%), which was also
the second most common reason African Americans were preferred (32.8%). It was also
fairly common to choose that preference was given to whites because the e-mail facilitated
the loan transaction (27.8%), although among MLOs that gave preference to African
Americans this occurred more often (30.7%). It was less common for graders to indicate
that preference was given to whites because of strong overt measures of discrimination
like offering more favorable terms (5.9%) 25 or steering into a product or being pushy
(1.4%).
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The side-by-side comparison done by outside reviewers is remarkably consistent
with our internal grading. Although outside reviewers graded e-mails as neutral less often
than the authors (43.9%, as opposed to 57.2), the net level of discrimination for favoring
whites is only 0.15 percentage points higher. Panel B of Table 8 shows tests for
discrimination in the content of response using the outside reviewer's opinion of MLO
replies. The outside reviewers perceived that e-mails to whites were more favorable 29.2%
of the time, while perceiving favorable e-mails for African Americans 26.4% of the time.
The net incidence of unequal treatment is 2.8% of MLOs, but this result is not quite
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.106. Outside reviewers were more likely to use
friendliness and the inclusion of details as reasons why whites were favored and less likely
to use the “other” category.

5.6. Type I error and multiple hypotheses

With any testing that involves multiple hypotheses, type I error, or rejecting a null
hypothesis that is true, may be a concern. In the context of discrimination experiments,
Ross et al. (2008) discuss the risk of type I error extensively and correct for it across
multiple hypotheses. Despite the strength of random assignment in experimental design in
protecting against bias, readers must remain cautious when interpreting the significance of
individual tests. We guard against type I error in two ways: first, we report p-values for the
range of single-hypothesis tests we set out to conduct, whether or not the results are
significant. This allows the reader to evaluate the significance of individual results against
the pattern of tests conducted. Second, we present a conservative adjustment to the pvalues for our primary results that control for type I error across multiple tests.
There are several strategies available to adjust hypothesis tests in order to yield
information about the probability of type I error for a group of tests. Anderson (2008)
provides an overview of two types of adjustments: one controls for the familywise error
rate, identifying the likelihood of at least one type I error occurring across a family of tests.
Another approach is to control the false discovery rate, or the rate at which one expects
type I errors to occur. We control for the familywise error rate using a conservative
adjustment procedure proposed in Holm (1979), which combines a Bonferroni correction
with a step-down testing approach. The method produces adjusted p-values for each test
that reflect the probability of at least one type I error across the family of tests should the
null be rejected for that particular test, as implemented in Newson (2010).

Table 10 presents a summary of the 15 outcomes in our primary results. Column (1)
shows the point estimate of the difference between whites and African Americans for the
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15 tests and column (2) repeats the p-value under single hypothesis testing. Column (3)
shows the adjusted p-value for each test in the context of the group. This value is the upper
bound of the probability that rejecting the null hypothesis will result in at least one type I
error among the 15 outcomes. Two of our primary results are impervious to this correction
at the 5% threshold: the response difference across all audits and whether a follow-up
email was received. The marginally significant results in Table 9, however, fail to reject the
null hypothesis at any acceptable level of confidence for detecting a single type I error
across the family of 15 tests.26

5.7. Why do MLOs discriminate?

Although our experiment is not specifically designed to test for the reasons why
MLOs discriminate against African American clients, the data generated from our
experiment allows us to explore this question to some degree. The standard theories
behind why discrimination occurs fall into two basic categories: taste-based (Becker,
1957), and statistical (Phelps, 1972). In statistical discrimination, an agent treats a
minority client differently because they are making some assumption about their
characteristics (typically this is described as assigning group averages), and find
interacting with them to be less profitable in expectation. Taste based discrimination
reflects an agent's preferences toward majority and minority groups. List (2004)
differentiates between statistical and taste based discrimination by carefully designing a
series of experiments in the sports card marketplace that involves a dictator game with
market participants, a design which is not possible in our setting.27

As an alternative to a formal test, we consider how the interaction between credit
score and race should generally affect response between whites and African Americans. If
MLOs are practicing taste-based discrimination, we should find a constant level of
discrimination across all credit score categories (compared to an equivalent white credit
score). If MLOs practice statistical discrimination, are agnostic about the quality of credit
reporting between groups, and generally assume that African Americans have lower credit
scores, then reporting higher credit scores should confirm what they believe about whites
(not changing response) and raise the likelihood they respond to African Americans. This
would result in mitigating discrimination among the high credit score group, relative to the
no credit score reported group. Reporting lower credit scores should confirm what MLOs
believe about African Americans (not changing response), but lower the likelihood they
respond to whites, resulting in mitigating discrimination relative to the no credit score
group.
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If MLOs hold the beliefs described above, then the results in Table 7 broken down by
credit category generally support that MLOs are not practicing taste-based discrimination.
The difference in response by race between credit score groups is not constant, ranging
from as much as 4.75 percentage points in the lower credit score group to as small as 0.66
percentage points in the high credit score group. The difference between African
Americans and whites is much larger when both report no credit score than when both
report high credit scores, suggesting that statistical discrimination is what is driving the
results. In fact, when both report high credit scores, the response rate and MLO level tests
cannot reject equal treatment. The strongest result within credit score groups is that
discrimination exists when both groups report low credit scores, which does not match our
intuition for statistical discrimination. The larger level (4.75 percentage points) of
discrimination relative to the no credit score group is driven by an increase in white
response rates, and a decrease in African American response rates. While this does not fit
neatly with our explanation of standard statistical discrimination, one possibility for this
finding is that MLOs differentially weigh credit score information from whites and African
Americans. It could be that when whites report a low score it is viewed as something that
can be improved, but when African Americans report a low credit score it is viewed as
revealing a problem borrower.

Bertrand et al. (2005) suggests an alternative to the standard taste-based and
statistical explanations for discrimination. They suggest that agents may not make a
conscious choice when discriminating, but instead discriminate unintentionally or
implicitly because of an unconscious association between a person of a certain type and
some identified attribute. This type of discrimination is tested in the laboratory by showing
subjects photographs of people in a rapid manner and requiring that they assign them to
some category (e.g. good or bad). Requiring quick reaction attempts to identify the
subconscious thoughts of the subject. Our experiment does not lend itself to a formal test of
implicit discrimination, but the nature of the timing in MLO responses is suggestive. Table 8
shows a large gap between the average time it takes an MLO to respond to our subjects—
they respond faster to whites. This is suggestive that on the margin, more MLOs are making
the quick decision to respond to whites and to set aside the e-mail from the African
American until later, which suggests the motivation for discrimination may be implicit
rather than conscious discrimination.

6. Robustness of findings
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We explore the sensitivity of our findings to three particular choices in the original
experiment: choosing a sample of MLOs based on state population weights, the particular
names used in correspondence with MLOs, and the primary statistical tests for inference.

To create a national sample of MLOs, we decided to use the population of each state
relative to the country as a whole to guide our selection across geography. This choice
means that our sample necessarily includes more MLOs from highly populous states like
California, Texas, and Florida, regardless of the African American population living in those
states. While we are confident that our results represent the level of disparate treatment in
our sample, we recognize that choosing a sample with different criteria may affect the
overall level of reported discrimination.

To explore the possibility that the level of discrimination we find would be different
if we would have initially chosen a different sample of MLOs, we re-weight our results by
various population characteristics that may affect the level of discrimination. The
characteristics we consider as alternative weights are: homeownership, African American
homeownership, household income, and African American household income. These
weights represent characteristics that influence participation in the mortgage market,
which may vary for African Americans in certain areas. For each weighting scheme, we
apply weights equal to the percentage of national totals in each state and calculated a
weighted response/non-response based on these weights.

Table 11 shows our primary results after re-weighting our sample by the
characteristics alongside our population weighted standard results. We generally find that
re-weighting increases the level of discrimination relative to our primary findings.
Weighting by household income produces the largest differences, with net discrimination
rates as high as 3.38 percentage points. In all cases our results remain qualitatively similar,
but the different weighting schemes do highlight that sample choice may influence the level
of reported discrimination.
Table 11. Robustness of primary results to alternative sample weights.

All audits

Overall response rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
White African
(1)–(2)
American

68.31% 65.68%
[3540] [3402]

2.63%
p = 0.0022***

Response at MLO level
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Respond Respond White
African
(6)–(7)
to neither to both
only
American
only
16.28% 49.77% 17.88% 16.07%
1.81%
[632]
[1932]
[694] [624]
p = 0.0573*
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67.99% 65.03%

2.96%

Response at MLO level
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Respond Respond White
African
(6)–(7)
to neither to both
only
American
only
16.05% 48.75% 18.02% 16.45%
1.57%

African American 68.00% 65.48%
homeownership
weights

2.52%

16.17%

Homeownership
weights

Overall response rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
White African
(1)–(2)
American

Median household 68.00% 64.63%
income weights
African American 68.12% 64.74%
household income
weights

p = 0.0000***
p = 0.0000***

48.53%

18.51% 16.63%

3.37%

15.70%

50.25%

17.38% 15.15%

3.38%

15.53%

50.60%

17.35% 14.99%

p = 0.0000***

p = 0.0964*
1.88%

p = 0.0483**
2.23%

p = 0.0147**
2.36%

p = 0.0000***
p = 0.0096***
Notes: The p-value represented in column (3) is from a one-sided t-test (alternative hypothesis of a
positive difference) with a null hypothesis that the difference in average response rate is zero. The pvalue reported in column (8) is from McNemar paired difference in proportions test. This test is
designed for testing the difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects, the test statistic is
χ^2 = (N_(Only W)-N_(Only AA) )^2/ (N_(Only W)+N_(Only AA)), where N represents the number of
MLOs only responding to one group. The test statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all
p-values accordingly. Number of MLOs shown in [], *,0.10 significance; **, 0.05 significance; ***, 0.01
significance.

Table 12. Name robustness and national popularity.
Name
Jake Krueger
Brett Nelson
Brendan Nelson
Ethan Schmitt
Luke Krueger
Tyrone Washington
Jermaine Booker
Zachary Miller
Reginald Jackson
Darnell Jackson
Conor Schmitt
Spencer Miller
Jamal Washington
Seth Baker

Response rate
72.62%
70.92%
70.09%
69.70%
69.65%
68.80%
68.01%
67.98%
67.96%
67.42%
67.13%
66.26%
66.08%
65.77%

Different than own race
p = 0.0422
p = 0.2304
p = 0.3988
p = 0.5146
p = 0.5215
p = 0.1324
p = 0.2948
p = 0.8761
p = 0.3082
p = 0.4379
p = 0.5834
p = 0.3510
p = 0.8533
p = 0.2352

National popularity
140
84
155
58
118
260
306
22
230
353
458
105
247
102
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Name
Kadeem Jefferson
Maxwell Baker
DaQuan Booker
Jerome Jefferson
Terrell Banks
DaShawn Banks

Response rate
64.71%
64.66%
63.54%
63.05%
62.93%
62.62%

Different than own race
p = 0.6751
p = 0.0901
p = 0.3184
p = 0.2101
p = 0.2110
p = 0.1599

National popularity
538
188
709
264
282
732

Notes: P-value is for a difference in means t-test between the response rate for each name and names of

the same race. National popularity ranking comes from the Social Security Administration website using
counts of baby names from 1990 at: http://www.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/popularnames.cgi

Identifying discrimination in correspondence experiments relies on the choice of
names being representative of race groups. The birth certificate data we use demonstrates
that the names in our experiment are highly correlated with the race we assign, but they
leave open the possibility that particular names are treated differently for other reasons.
While we do not have the ability to infer why this might be, we can examine how our choice
of names may affect our results.
We consider two sets of robustness checks with the names in the experiment. First,
we examine response rate differences between each name and other names of the same
race, and exclude names that are treated statistically different. Next we examine national
data on name popularity and exclude the most and least popular names in each race.

Table 12 shows the response rate by name in the experiment. Since our findings
show that African Americans experience lower response rates, most of the top response
rates come from white names. We preform t-tests of the response rate differences between
each name and the average within-race response rate; these results are shown in the
second column of Table 12. There are only two statistically distinguishable (among own
race) names in our experiment: Jake Krueger has a higher response rate than other whites
(p = 0.0422) and Maxwell Baker has a lower response rate than other withes (p
= 0.0901).
Excluding white names with a higher than average response rate (Jake Krueger)
narrows the gap between white and African American response rates, as shown in column
1 of Table 13. We are somewhat confident in these results as both tests show a similar
(albeit smaller) gap between whites and African Americans, and the response rate tests
maintain statistical significance. The within MLO results do not maintain statistical
significance, but this is likely due to sample size restriction that comes with excluding 10%
of the already smaller sample. Results excluding the other name that showed statistically
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different outcomes, Maxwell Baker, are in line with our primary results, and in fact show a
slightly larger response rate difference. The third row shows that if we exclude white name
with the highest and African American name with the lowest response rate then the
magnitude of our results is smaller but still statistically meaningful for the response rate
difference, but it loses marginal statistical significance for the MLO level test.
Table 13. Results excluding popular or unique names.
Overall response rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
White African
(1)-(2)
American

Exclude Jake
67.83%
Krueger (5% level
different than own
race)
[3158]
Exclude Jake
68.46%
Krueger and
Maxwell Baker
(10% different than
own race)
[2835]
Exclude DaShawn 67.83%
Banks and Jake
Krueger (highest
white, lowest AA)
[3158]
Exclude Zachary 68.35%
Miller and DaShawn
Banks (most
popular white, least
popular AA)
[3194]
Exclude Zachary 68.18%
Miller and Ethan
Schmitt (2 most
popular)
[2826]
Exclude DaShawn 68.31%
Banks and DaQuan
Booker (2 least
popular)
[3540]

Response at MLO level
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Respond Respond White
African
(6)–(7)
to neither to both
only
American
only
16.41% 49.71% 17.53% 16.35%
1.18%

65.68%

2.15%

[3402]
65.68%

p = 0.0119** [571]

[1730]
50.31%

[610] [569]
17.75% 16.07%

p = 0.2440

[3402]
66.02%

p = 0.0023*** [490]

[1553]
49.98%

[548] [496]
17.61% 16.14%

p = 0.1144

[3072]
66.02%

p = 0.0321** [508]

[1561]
50.94%

[550] [504]
17.43% 15.61%

p = 0.1657

[3072]
65.68%

p = 0.0083*** [503]

[1599]
50.47%

[547] [490]
17.27% 15.97%

p = 0.0820*

[3402]
66.35%

p = 0.0054*** [503]

[1558]
50.36%

[533] [493]
17.85% 16.17%

p = 0.2234

[2727]

p = 0.0224** [482]

[1554]

[551]

p = 0.1155

2.78%

1.81%

2.33%

2.50%

1.96%

15.87%

16.27%

16.02%

16.29%

15.62%

[499]

1.68%

1.47%

1.82%

1.30%

1.68%
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Notes: The p-value represented in column (3) is from a one-sided t-test (alternative hypothesis of a
positive difference) with a null hypothesis that the difference in average response rate is zero. The p-

value reported in column (8) is from McNemar paired difference in proportions test. This test is
designed for testing the difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects, the test statistic is
χ^2 = (N_(Only W)-N_(Only AA) )^2/ (N_(Only W)+N_(Only AA)), where N represents the number of
MLOs only responding to one group. The test statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all
p-values accordingly. Number of MLOs shown in [], *,0.10 significance; **, 0.05 significance; ***, 0.01
significance.
Table 14. Robustness of primary results to alternative inference method.
(1)
White only
All audits
17.88%
[694]
Equal credit
17.97%
[466]
White higher credit
23.04%
[97]
African American higher credit 12.63%
[48]

(2)
African American only
16.07%
[624]
16.35%
[424]
12.83%
[54]
19.74%
[75]

(3)
McNemar
1.81%
p = 0.0573*
1.62%
p = 0.1693
10.21%
p = 0.0006***
–7.11%
p = 0.0187**

(4)
Liddell
1.11
p = 0.0286**
1.09
p = 0.0847*
1.71
p = 0.0003***
1.53
p = 0.0009***

(5)
Sign test

p = 0.0287**
p = 0.0846*

p = 0.0002***

p = 0.0097***
Notes: The p-value represented in column (3) is from the McNemar test described in all other tables.
The p-value reported in column (4) is from the Liddell Test. This test is designed for testing the ratio of
subjects only responding to one group over those only responding to the other; the statistic is
F = (N_(Only W))/ (1+N_(Only AA)), where N represents the number of MLOs only responding to one
group. The test statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and we calculate all p-values accordingly. The
sign test compares the number of times a MLO favors a white (African American) relative to the
expectation that this would occur in half of observations; the test statistic is from a binomial distribution
with the number of observations equal to the number of times when one group was favored (1318 in
our data). Number of MLOs shown in [], *,0.10 significance; **, 0.05 significance; ***, 0.01 significance.

We also examine differences in general popularity of the names in our experiment
using Social Security Administrative data. This data reports counts of name for babies born
nationally each year (unconditional on race) for the 1000 most common names. All names
in our experiment are among the 1000 most common in popularity for the year of our birth
certificate data (1990). As a result of population shares, white names are necessarily more
popular among the general population, but one of the white names (Conor) is quite
unpopular nationally relative to other white names. The third column of Table 12 shows
popularity ranks for all names in our data.
Excluding the most popular white name (Zackary Miller) and the least popular
African American name (DaShawn Banks) does not affect either the response rate or MLO
level results, as shown in Table 13. In each case, the magnitude of the difference is
extremely similar and we maintain the same level of significance as our primary results.
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We also explore excluding the two most popular white names, and (separately) excluding
the two least popular African American names. In either case the response rate results are
similar in magnitude to our primary results and maintain statistical significance. The MLO
level results also show a similar magnitude to the primary results, but lose statistical
significance.

Our primary means of inference at the MLO level is the McNemar test, which is
designed to account for an experiment that is run in pairs, as it considers that some
proportion of the subjects in the experiment will respond only to whites or only to African
Americans. The McNemar test uses all of this information, where simple difference-inproportions tests do not. There are several alternatives to the McNemar test for paired
data, the most common being the sign test and the exact Liddell test (Liddell, 1983). The
Liddell test is preferred in medical applications as it offers a confidence interval on the
ratio of subjects that only respond to the treated and only to the untreated (in our
application this is the proportion responding to whites only, divided by the proportion
responding to African Americans only). Ross et al. (2008) use a sign test for inference in an
in-person mortgage discrimination experiment with matched pairs. The sign test, like the
McNemar test relies on the difference in occurrence of unequal treatment from the same
MLO across the sample.
We re-examine inference for our key results using both the sign test and the exact
Liddell test. The results of these tests, reported in Table 14, all show increased levels of
statistical precision over the McNemar test. We are therefore confident that the means of
inference are not driving our results.

7. Conclusion

We find evidence of discrimination against African Americans in the market for
mortgage loans. The discrimination we find occurs at the initial information gathering
stage for borrowers in response to a simple e-mail inquiry about assistance with obtaining
a mortgage. We find that MLOs, the primary contact person for a borrower looking to
obtain a mortgage, are less likely to respond to inquiries from clients with African
American names than they are to clients with white names. We also find that MLOs
responding to inquiries from both races are more likely to write a preferential e-mail to
white clients. The level of discrimination we find is large for a characteristic that should not
matter (race) relative to one that should matter (credit score).
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Finding discrimination in the information gathering stage is likely to influence
outcomes for minority borrowers throughout the lending and home buying process. If
African American borrowers are less likely to receive communication from an MLO and the
MLO treats them differently when communication does occur, it makes submitting a loan
application more difficult, and the remainder of the home purchase more arduous. In
addition, our work shows that the growing importance of e-mail communication between
clients and lenders, where in-person meetings are less and less common, does not mean
that discrimination on the basis of race will not occur.
The magnitude of discrimination we find is smaller than the most recent in-person
study (Ross et al., 2008); however, the standard for compliance is much lower in our most
basic test: we only examine if MLOs are willing to respond to an e-mail. Several of our
correspondence based results are similar in nature to the in-person results in Ross et al.
(focusing on their differential treatment tests for the Chicago sample). Both the Ross et al.
work and our work show that that African Americans are less likely than whites to receive
follow up communication, and less likely than whites to be given details about loan
products. Ross et al. find additional differences showing that whites were more likely to be
given the information they requested and more likely to be given advice or “coaching” that
may help in qualifying for a loan.

Our findings confirm that discrimination still exists in the lending industry, and that
it exists across a larger sample, and geographic scope than previous studies have examined.
We are also able to compare the difference in treatment between whites and African
Americans with the difference in treatment across credit score groups. Our average
differences suggest an African American name reduces the probability that an MLO
responds by the same magnitude as does reporting a credit score that is 71 points lower.
Our results suggest that examining lending outcomes is not sufficient to uncover the
level of discrimination that minorities face in the lending process. Our work also suggests
that to uncover the full extent of discrimination in this market, multiple types of
communication should be used in addition to in-person audits, and that enforcement of
Fair Lending Laws would be more robust if audits included other means of communication.
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Appendix 1. Correspondence construction
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Appendix 2. Side-by-side comparison tool

Appendix 3. Grader instructions for side-by-side comparison

Thank you for agreeing to help out with this research project. Your task is simple-to
review a set of e-mail responses we received from mortgage lenders and compare them.
We are interested to know if you feel the responses you read tend to be more favorable
toward one set of recipients than another, or if they are treated approximately the same.
Essentially, we want to know your opinion. Please use the format we've supplied by
enabling external content in excel and simply clicking on the “Open Form” button. After
entering the form, please start by typing your name in the ID box. Next, read both e-mails
carefully. After reading both e-mails, please indicate if you thought the mortgage lender
strongly preferred one, preferred the other, or treated the recipients neutrally using the
check box indicator.
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If you thought that the mortgage lender expressed a preference, please use the next
section of check boxes to indicate why you felt this way. Feel free to use the “other” check
box in the event that your opinion does not match a reason listed, or if you can't quite
describe why you feel that way. You can also fill in a reason for “other” to describe your
reasoning. Please use the following as guidance when checking boxes for your reasons:
More favorable terms (interest rate, etc.): Check this box if the lender replied with
more favorable loan terms to one recipient than the other. This could be in a quoted or
suggested interest rate, length of loan, type of loan, fees, or anything else that has to do
with costs to the borrower.

Friendliness: Check this box if you feel the lender was more ‘friendly’ to one
recipient than the other. Again, this is your opinion, we will not hold it against you.

Included more details: Check this box if you feel the lender gave a more detailed
description of the products, application materials needed, or generally gave answers with
more depth to one recipient than the other.

Explained the process: Check this box if you feel the lender offered more guidance on
the lending process, the application process, or the home purchase process to one recipient
than the other. This might include offers on how to improve credit, or necessary paper
work to complete an application.

Un-preferred email was more negative: Check this box if you thought that one of the
e-mails was negative, even if the other e-mail was neutral. This might include negative
language, unusually short replies (relative to the other), or a rude tone in writing.
Facilitated the transaction: Check this box if you feel the lender attempted to
facilitate a successful transaction more with one recipient than the other. This might
include offers for future communication, providing application materials, encouraging an
application, or offering help with credit issues or home search.

Un-preferred email steered into a product or was pushy: Check this box if you feel the
lender was being pushy about selling a loan, or suggested a specific product that was
“right” for the recipient and not the other. Differentiating between this box and facilitating
a transaction will largely depend on your interpretation of the language of the e-mail.
Remember, this is your opinion.
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1The

FFIEC maintains summary statistics of HMDA data on its website at:
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmdaadwebreport/NatAggWelcome.aspx.
2This difference is not conditional on borrower characteristics and is the difference in the mean interest
rate reported for loans where the interest rate is known on conventional, 1-4 family home
purchase loans (excluding manufactured homes) between 2004 and 2008. See GruensteinBocian et al. (2008) for a study that examines interest rate differences across race groups
conditional on borrower characteristics.
3See Ross and Yinger (2002) for a particularly lucid explanation of discrimination in the lending process,
including an explanation and critique of research methodology.
4There are several recent studies that use e-mail correspondence to test for discrimination in the market
for rental housing. See Hanson and Hawley (2011) for a recent example and a review of this
literature. Also see Ladd (1998), Yinger and Ross (2002), and Ross et al. (2008) for a review of
the literature on discrimination in mortgage markets in particular.
5See Smith and Delair (1999) for a summary of early evidence on discrimination by mortgage lenders
from a sample of enforcement-based in-person audits which covers five US cities.
6See Doleac and Stein (2013) for a novel approach to avoiding the use of actors by studying
discrimination using pictures in an on-line market. This work varies the skin color of the seller
to test for discrimination among buyers of iPods.
739.5% of borrowers report using sellers of financial services as a method of obtaining information
about borrowing. The most commonly used source of information about borrowing is “friends,
relatives, and associates” with 43.9% of borrowers using that channel (Bricker et al., 2010).
8The net level of discrimination measures the difference in the percentage of MLOs that only reply to an
inquiry from a white client against the percentage of MLOs that only reply to an inquiry from an
African American client. The gross level of discrimination or the percentage of MLOs that only
reply to an inquiry from a white client is 17.8% of MLOs. The overall difference in response rates
is 2.6 percentage points favoring whites—this difference does not match the net discrimination
level because some of our experiments involved sending inquiries from same race clients to the
same MLO.
9The Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act (SAFE), part of the larger Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008, included several provisions to tighten regulations of MLOs.
These provisions included requiring licensing of MLOs, creating a Nationwide Mortgage
Licensing System (NMLS), issuing uniform licensing applications and reporting requirements
across states, and creating a national clearing house for collecting consumer complaints.
10See Munnell et al. (1996) for a study that identifies denial rate differences between African American
and white clients controlling for credit differences.
11The experiment attempts to uncover discrimination from differential treatment based on minority
status. Scholars (and governments) have also recognized that disparate impact, or having a
policy that disproportionately impacts minorities while lacking business purpose is
discrimination. See Turner and Skidmore (1999) for a discussion about the difference between
differential treatment and disparate impact in mortgage lending.
12In general, the use of names to identify race may be concerning as names may also reveal something
else about the characteristics of a client, such as social class (which may be important if it is
correlated with ability to repay a loan). We believe the inclusion of credit scores in our
experiment helps minimize the concern that important unobservables besides race are inferred
through the client name. Doleac and Stein (2013) use pictures to identify race in an
experimental setting to avoid this criticism. Research by Pope and Sydnor (2011) and Ravina
(2012) use pictures to identify race in observational studies of credit markets.
13The low credit score range approximates the 15–30th percentile of the national distribution of credit
scores according to the Fair Isaac Company (FICO). The high credit score range approximates
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the 40–60th percentile of the national FICO score distribution (FRB, 2007). Most MLOs seem to
operate using a rule on an acceptable credit score (like a minimum of 620); we noticed that the
reported rule varied across the responses we received. Our low score sample seems to straddle
the rule in all areas.
14There is almost no difference in the response rate across types of e-mails. The response rate for the
question set #1 group is 67.2. The response rate for the question set #2 group is 66.8. This
difference is not statistically meaningful.
15We also randomly vary the order in which e-mails are sent. For each matched pair type the order of
the treatment difference (e.g. high versus low credit score) is randomly reversed in exactly half
the emails. We do this to ensure that order effects do not drive any results.
16We use Gmail addresses exclusively, and all take the form firstname.surnameXXX@gmail.com, where
XXX is a random three-digit number.
17The actual sample in our experiment is not exactly proportional with 2010 state populations. This is
partly due to randomly selecting MLOs from this sample to be subjects and partly due to the fact
that availability of MLO information is not uniform across geography.
18Random selection for a round depends on the number of MLOs at a branch. Spreading a branch's MLOs
through multiple rounds is done to ensure no more than two emails from any of our clients
arrive at an office on any given day. The structure of this selection, however, is independent of
treatment assignment.
19Of the responses we consider genuinely human, 99.8% of them were received within 2 weeks of our
original inquiry. We count the other 0.02% as non-responses.
20Recall that the full sample includes some audits where inquiries had the same race, but different credit
characteristics.
21We identified different types of institutions using the institution name in our data.
22For all statistical significance tests at the MLO level, we use the McNemar test. This test is designed for
testing the difference in proportion of respondents for paired subjects. The test statistic is
χ2=(NOnlyW−NOnlyAA)2/(NOnlyW+NOnlyAA) where N represents the number of MLOs only
responding to one group. The McNemar test statistic has a chi-squared distribution, and we
calculate all p-values accordingly.
23We also test for differences when both scores are high, both low, and both do not include credit. These
results show a similar level of discrimination as the results that combine these groups, but
statistical precision is even more strained due to smaller sample sizes in these sub groups.
24We used a team of 10 different reviewers.
25Graders were asked to indicate that more favorable terms were offered if the lender replied with more
favorable loan terms to one recipient than the other. This could be in a quoted or suggested
interest rate, length of loan, type of loan, fees, or anything else that has to do with costs to the
borrower.
26We also examined the results of e-mail content for joint significance, using a similar method to Bifulco
et al. (2011). These tests are intended to uncover an overall pattern of discrimination that
would not have occurred by chance, even if individual tests are not significant. The results of the
joint tests do not produce any evidence of discrimination that was not apparent in our standard
or corrected individual tests.
27Also see Ewens et al. (2014) and Neumark (2012) for work that explicitly tests for the cause of racial
discrimination.
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